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Category Errors and Executive Power 
Jonathan H. Adler*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the Obama Administration has taken 
multiple actions to blunt the impact of federal law upon the private sector. In 
the context of implementing the Affordable Care Act and the Clean Air Act, 
the Administration has asserted not only the authority to determine when, and 
how stringently, to enforce relevant provisions, but also the authority to 
waive or delay legal obligations enacted by Congress. These actions, among 
others, have prompted accusations that the Administration is exceeding the 
proper bounds of executive authority.1 The ensuing debate—and litigation—
over these actions has generated a good deal of confusion about the nature 
and scope of executive power. 
Commentators have often misunderstood or mischaracterized the nature 
of the acts taken and their potential legal justifications, blurring the 
distinction between permissible executive discretion over matters of 
enforcement with broader discretion to adjust legal benefits and burdens. 
Specifically, some have sought to defend as exercises of enforcement 
discretion actions that are better characterized as efforts to “suspend” or alter 
legal obligations imposed by duly enacted legislation. This illustrates 
confusion about the nature of executive power and the different sorts of 
actions the executive branch takes in the course of implementing and 
enforcing federal law. 
It is undisputed that the executive branch may exercise discretion when 
deciding how federal law is to be enforced, particularly when it comes to 
prosecuting those who violate federal law. Such enforcement discretion is 
only one type of discretion that the executive branch may exercise, however. 
Not every decision to reduce the burden imposed by federal law can be 
characterized as an exercise of enforcement discretion. While the President 
has substantial authority to determine how, when, and even whether federal 
law is to be enforced, the President has no inherent authority to waive legal 
           *   Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law & 
Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This essay was prepared for the FIU Law 
Review Separation of Powers Symposium, March 11, 2016. 
1 See generally Andrew Prokop, How Barack Obama Is Expanding Presidential Power—And 
What It Means for the Future, VOX (Sept. 9, 2014), www.vox.com/2014/9/9/5964421/obama-lawsuit-
republicans-abuse-of-power. For more specific accusations, see The President’s Constitutional Duty to 
Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hearing Before H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 3, 2013), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/the-president-s-constitutional-duty-to-faithfully-execute-the-laws-2.
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requirements or suspend the law. Nonenforcement and suspension are not the 
same thing. 
The purpose of this brief essay is to provide some clarity in the muddled 
discussion over executive power. Specifically, the aim is to help clarify what 
sorts of actions taken by the executive branch can be properly characterized 
as “enforcement” actions—where the President’s inherent authority to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion applies—and what sorts of actions cannot. 
Specifically, this essay seeks to explain why some particularly controversial 
actions—such as the Administration’s decision to delay the so-called 
employer mandate imposed by the Affordable Care Act2 (ACA) and to 
“tailor” the application of federal regulations governing greenhouse gas 
emissions under the Clean Air Act3 (CAA)—are not properly understood as 
exercises of enforcement discretion, and are therefore unlawful unless they 
can be justified on other grounds. 
Part I of this essay lays out some basic principles about the nature of 
executive power generally, and enforcement discretion in particular. Part II 
analyzes the Obama Administration’s repeated decisions to delay and modify 
the employer mandate. Part III turns to the Administration’s attempt to 
“tailor” CAA emission thresholds that trigger regulatory requirements so as 
to facilitate the regulation of greenhouse gases. The essay then concludes. 
I. EXECUTIVE POWER AND ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Article II of the Constitution provides that “the executive Power shall 
be vested in a President of the United States of America.”4 It further provides 
that the President has a constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”5 Accordingly, the President has both the power and 
the obligation to enforce federal law. 
Under Article II, the executive branch enforces and executes the law, 
but it does not legislate. “All legislative Powers” granted in the Constitution 
are “vested” in Congress.6 Federal agencies, while generally a part of the 
executive branch, are creatures of the legislature in that they only have that 
authority which Congress has delegated to them.7 Such delegations can only 
occur in statutes that have satisfied the requirements of bicameralism and 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) [hereinafter Affordable 
Care Act]. 
3 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
7 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an 
administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated 
by Congress.”); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no 
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
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presentment, and the executive branch must implement such laws within the 
relevant statutory boundaries.8
Once federal laws are enacted the executive branch maintains discretion 
over how the laws are to be enforced.9 The need for such discretion should 
be readily apparent.10 The executive branch cannot pursue each and every 
instance of lawbreaking. Resources are necessarily limited. Congress 
regularly enacts laws that exceed the ability of federal agencies to enforce in 
their entirety and in every applicable instance. In a world in which so much 
behavior is regulated (and even criminalized11), the cause of justice is not 
furthered by trying to pursue and punish each instance of potentially unlawful 
behavior to the ultimate extent—if such were even possible.12
Enforcement discretion entails the decision to direct and allocate limited 
resources and set priorities. When seeking to enforce the law, the executive 
branch must necessarily make choices about who to investigate, who to 
charge, and what punishments or penalties to seek. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Heckler v. Chaney, when enforcing a statute, the executive must 
determine not only “whether a violation has occurred,” but also “whether 
agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,” the likelihood 
that a prosecution will be successful, and whether a given enforcement action 
“best fits the agency’s overall policies.”13 Resolving such questions 
necessarily involves a degree of discretion, and such discretion is generally 
understood to be a core element of executive power.14 As such, it is largely 
(though not completely) insulated from legislative direction or judicial 
review.15
While the executive branch’s enforcement discretion is broad, it is not 
unlimited. It does not entitle administrative agencies to disregard statutory 
8 See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
9 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 675
(2014) (“[S]ome degree of enforcement discretion is a natural incident of the core executive function of 
applying general laws to particular cases.”). 
10 See id. at 681 (“The constitutional structure “presumes, and indeed depends on, prosecutorial 
charging discretion.”); id. at 673 (noting enforcement discretion is “central to the operation of both the 
federal criminal justice system and the administrative state”). 
11 See generally HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE 
INNOCENT (2009); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a 
Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102 (2013).
12 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“An agency generally cannot act against each 
technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.”). 
13 Id.
14 See id. (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal 
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”). 
15 Id. (noting that enforcement discretion is presumptively immune from judicial review). Note, 
however, that such decisions are “only presumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted 
where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its 
enforcement powers.” Id. at 832–33. 
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provisions that are deemed unwise or inconvenient, let alone the authority to 
waive legal obligations that are written into federal law.16 The power to 
decline to indict or prosecute is not the power to waive an underlying legal 
obligation or prohibition.17 The latter is not so much non-enforcement as it is 
suspension, and the executive branch has no such power.18 The constable’s 
authority to decide not to arrest every lawbreaker is not the power to suspend 
the law. Nor is the prosecutor’s authority to decline to seek an indictment the 
authority to create an exception to an otherwise valid statutory scheme.19
Whereas the executive branch can decide not to prioritize the 
enforcement of specific statutory provisions, it cannot waive or eliminate 
legal obligations that duly enacted laws impose on government agencies or 
private actors. An agency’s authority to allocate resources in accord with the 
executive branch’s policy choices does not allow it to disregard unwanted 
statutory mandates. Policy disagreement, or a belief that there is a better way 
to effectuate federal policy than that which has been enacted into law, does 
not authorize the executive branch to go its own way.20 As the Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel has succinctly explained, “the Executive 
cannot, under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to 
effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences.”21
The key point here is that not all actions taken by the executive branch 
to implement or execute the laws enacted by Congress are properly 
characterized as “enforcement,” and thus not every discretionary policy 
choice made by the executive branch may be characterized as an exercise of 
enforcement discretion. When the President is making choices about whom 
to prosecute, and on what basis, that is an exercise of the enforcement power. 
16 See Price, supra note 9, at 676 (The executive branch “exceeds its proper role, and enters the 
legislature’s domain, if without proper congressional authorization it uses enforcement discretion to 
categorically suspend enforcement or to license particular violations.”). 
17 See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Under Article II of the 
Constitution and relevant Supreme Court precedents, the President must follow statutory mandates so
long as there is appropriated money available and the President has no constitutional objection to the 
statute. So, too, the President must abide by statutory prohibitions unless the President has a constitutional 
objection to the prohibition.”) (emphasis in original). 
18 The power to suspend statutory obligations, as distinct from the power to decline to prosecute, 
was considered and rejected at the Constitutional Convention. See Price, supra note 9, at 692–93. 
19 See, e.g., Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (contrasting enforcement discretion with 
the authority to “make an exception” to a statutory requirement). 
20 See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he President and federal 
agencies may not ignore statutory mandates or prohibitions merely because of policy disagreement with 
Congress.”).
21 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens 
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 39 Op. O.L.C. 6 (Nov. 19, 2014)
(The OLC memorandum continues by noting that “an agency’s enforcement decisions should be 
consonant with, rather than contrary to, the congressional policy underlying the statutes the agency is 
charged with administering.”). 
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When the President is making other decisions about how to implement or 
operationalize a complex regulatory scheme, this is not an exercise of the 
enforcement power. The executive branch’s power here is necessarily 
constrained by the nature of the grant of authority from Congress.22 Such 
discretion may be broad, but it is a question of what a statute provides.23 And 
when the executive seeks to prevent the application of a legal provision that 
is self-executing—one that applies to private conduct on its own terms 
whether or not the executive branch seeks to enforce it—this is best 
characterized as suspension, which is unlawful unless authorized by 
Congress.24 Claims of enforcement discretion cannot excuse an 
administrative agency’s disregard of relevant statutory text or an attempt to 
waive statutory requirements. 
II. THE EMPLOYER MANDATE
In enacting the Affordable Care Act, Congress gave the executive lots 
to execute.25 The statute obligated many federal agencies throughout the 
executive branch to perform a wide range of functions so that the law’s 
various reforms and regulatory measures could take effect. 
Whether due to a lack of resources, the law’s inartful drafting,26 or 
political concerns about its effects, federal agencies have repeatedly failed to 
implement the ACA as it was enacted by Congress.27 There are numerous 
instances in which federal agencies have sought to waive relevant ACA 
requirements or to implement the law in a manner that does not conform to 
the relevant statutory text and authority granted by Congress.28
22 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007) (agency decision is arbitrary and 
capricious when based on “reasoning divorced from the statutory text”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 
833 (1985) (“Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme 
that the agency administers.”). 
23 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (administrative agency “must ground its reasons for action 
or inaction in the statute”). 
24 See Price, supra note 9, at 677 (“Without a clear statutory basis, an executive waiver of statutory 
requirements is a presumptively impermissible suspension of federal law.”). 
25 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO 
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (P.L. 111–148) (2010), www.ncsl.org/
documents/health/Regulations.pdf (“[I]t seems likely that there will be a great deal of regulatory activity 
relating to the many provisions in PPACA for years, or even decades to come.”). 
26 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015) (noting the ACA “contains more than a few 
examples of inartful drafting”); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: 
Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 76–79 
(2015) (describing the turmoil that surrounded the ACA’s enactment). 
27 See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. 
PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
28 Id.; see also Andy Grewal, Lurking Challenges to the ACA Tax Credit Regulations, 98 DAILY
TAX REP. J-1 (May 21, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2598317; Jonathan H. 
Adler, The Ad Hoc Implementation and Enforcement of Health Care Reform, in LIBERTY’S NEMESIS (D. 
Reuter & J. Yoo eds., 2016). 
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A particularly conspicuous example of the Obama Administration 
seeking to waive a legal requirement under the guise of enforcement 
discretion is the decision to delay the effective date, and then modify the 
application of, the employer mandate. The ACA imposes a “shared 
responsibility” requirement obligating employers with more than fifty 
employees to provide qualifying health insurance.29 Employers who fail to 
comply with this “employer mandate” are required to pay a penalty or “tax” 
that can reach $2,000 per employee beyond the thirtieth employee (i.e., a firm 
with fifty employees would pay the penalty on twenty).30 This provision 
exposes larger employers to substantial penalties if they fail to offer 
qualifying health insurance to their employees. 
Section 1513 of the ACA expressly provides that this mandate, and the 
accompanying tax liability, was to “apply to months beginning after 
December 31, 2013.”31 In other words, this provision of the law was due to 
take effect at the start of 2014. In July 2013, however, the Department of the 
Treasury announced in a blog post that it would delay the employer mandate 
by a year.32 The stated reason for this delay was “the complexity of the 
requirements” imposed on employers and “the need for more time to 
implement them effectively.”33 Later that month the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) published a guidance detailing the “transition relief” to be 
afforded employers from the employer mandate and associated information 
reporting requirements.34
Seven months later, in February 2014, Treasury Department announced 
further delays of and modifications to the employer mandate.35 Specifically, 
Treasury declared that the mandate would be delayed until 2016 for firms 
with fewer than one hundred employees. In addition, Treasury announced 
that firms with over one hundred employees would only need to provide 
qualifying insurance to seventy percent of their full-time employees in 2015, 
and ninety-five percent of employees thereafter, in order to avoid the 
statutory penalties. The Administration not only waived the effective date for 
the employer mandate, it also invented a new set of staggered requirements 
29 See Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(c) (2012). 
30 Id.
31 See Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1513(d), 124 Stat. 119, 256 (2010) (“The 
amendments made by this section shall apply to months beginning after December 31, 2013.”). 
32 See Mark Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, TREAS.
NOTES (July 2, 2013), www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Continuing-to-Implement-the-ACA-in-a-
Careful-Thoughtful-Manner-.aspx.
33 Id.
34 See Transition Relief for 2014 Under §§ 6055 (§ 6055 Information Reporting), 6056 (§ 6056 
Information Reporting) and 4980H (Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions), NOT-129718-13, I.R.S. 
(July 9, 2013), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-45.pdf. 
35 See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8574 
(Feb. 12, 2014). 
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for firms. Again, agency officials said their intent was to help employers 
adjust to the law’s requirements, though some observers saw more political 
motivations.36
In justifying these delays, the Treasury Department claimed that it has 
broad authority to offer “transition relief” in implementing a complex law 
like the ACA. Specifically, Department officials claimed delaying the 
effective date of the employer mandate was an ordinary exercise of its 
“longstanding authority to grant transition relief when implementing new 
legislation.”37 Outside commentators suggested that this was nothing more 
than a “sensible adjustment[] to phase-in enforcement, not a refusal to 
enforce.”38 It is true that the Treasury Department’s decision was not a 
“refusal to enforce” the employer mandate. It was something far more—and 
far more difficult to justify. 
In delaying the employer mandate, the Treasury Department did not 
assert the authority to delay enforcement of the law so much as it asserted the 
authority to waive the law’s requirements altogether. To defend this as 
enforcement discretion is not only to get the wrong answer. It reflects a 
failure to ask the right question, as the power to decline to enforce is not the 
power to delay a statutorily imposed obligation. This is not a matter of 
enforcement discretion at all. 
When Congress provides that a given legal requirement takes effect on 
a date certain, that is when the legal requirement takes effect. Such provisions 
of law are, in effect, self-executing.39 If, as the Administration has claimed, 
the employer mandate penalty is a tax, that tax liability for non-complying 
employers began to accrue at the start of 2014. As Congress did not delegate 
the executive branch authority to waive or delay this requirement, there was 
no authority for these delays. 
36 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, White House Delays Health Insurance Mandate for 
Medium-Size Employers Until 2016, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/natio
nal/health-science/white-house-delays-health-insurance-mandate-for-medium-sized-employers-until-201
6/2014/02/10/ade6b344-9279-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html (“[M]any across the ideological 
spectrum viewed them as an effort by the White House to defuse another health-care controversy before 
the fall midterm elections.”). 
37 See Letter from Mark Mazur, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, to 
Representative Fred Upton, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. (July 9, 2013), 
https://perma-archives.org/warc/6Z3L-Z4B9/id_/file:/6Z3L-Z4B9/cap.pdf. 
38 Executive Overreach in Domestic Affairs Part 1—Health Care and Immigration: Written 
Statement of Simon Lazarus Hearing Before the H.R. Judiciary Comm. Exec. Overreach Task Force (Mar. 
15, 2014), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Lazarus-03.15.2016-1.pdf.
39 See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 144 n.21 (1985) (noting “it is ‘essential’ to distinguish ‘self-
executing feature[s] of [a] statute’ from actions taken subsequently to implement the legislative 
command”) (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 533 (1982)). See also Adam M. Samaha, Self-
Executing Statutes in the Administrative State, in THE TIMING OF LEGAL INTERVENTION (Frank Fagan & 
Saul Levmore eds., forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2720309. 
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Whatever the stated reason for the delays, nothing in the ACA 
authorizes the executive branch to waive the application of the employer 
mandate penalties. The text of the ACA is quite clear. It provides that the 
employer mandate provisions “shall apply” after December 31, 2013.40 Other 
provisions of the ACA reinforce the significance of this effective date. For 
example, the ACA expressly provides for the amount of the employer penalty 
to be assessed in 2014, and then provides for the penalties to be adjusted for 
inflation in subsequent years.41
Under the guise of enforcement discretion, the IRS has the ability to 
offer some relief to those who may have difficulty meeting newly imposed 
legal obligations. For instance, the IRS has the authority to decline to seek 
penalties for failing to meet administrative requirements and perhaps even to 
waive a reporting deadline, for all practical purposes, by refusing to seek 
penalties against those who miss the deadline. Such actions are 
fundamentally different from seeking to eliminate an accrued tax liability or 
waive a self-executing legal requirement. Refusing to enforce a statutory 
provision is different from claiming a statutory provision does not apply or 
has no legal force. 
Although the Treasury Department claimed the delay was nothing more 
than a routine exercise of “longstanding authority to grant transition relief 
when implementing new legislation,”42 the Department failed to identify an 
applicable precedent. The Department cited numerous instances where such 
authority was used, but in none of the cases cited did the Department purport 
to grant prospective relief to a statutorily imposed liability on private parties 
without express statutory authorization. The Treasury Department cited cases 
in which the IRS waived potentially applicable penalties or allowed deferred 
payment of tax liabilities, but these are easily distinguishable.43
The employer mandate delay was not an exercise of enforcement 
discretion, nor was it the sort of transitional relief the IRS has engaged in 
before. It was a naked effort to suspend a statutory obligation, as even some 
legal commentators who are generally supportive of the Administration’s 
ACA implementation efforts acknowledged. Writing in the New England 
Journal of Medicine, University of Michigan law professor Nicholas Bagley 
40 See Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1513(d), 124 Stat. 119, 256 (2010) (“The 
amendments made by this section shall apply to months beginning after December 31, 2013.”). 
41 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(5). 
42 See Letter from Mark Mazur, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, to 
Representative Fred Upton, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. (July 9, 2013), 
https://perma-archives.org/warc/6Z3L-Z4B9/id_/file:/6Z3L-Z4B9/cap.pdf. 
43 See Nicholas Bagley, The Legality of Delaying Key Elements of the ACA, 370 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 1967, 1969 (2014) (The precedents relied upon by the Treasury Department provide “slim support 
for a sweeping objection that will relieve thousands of employers from a substantial tax for as long as 2 
years.”).
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noted the employer mandate delay appeared “to exceed the scope of the 
executive’s traditional enforcement discretion” and cannot be justified as an 
exercise of executive branch authority to prioritize limited agency 
resources.44
The Administration’s authority to delay and alter the employer mandate 
has been challenged in federal court, but it is uncertain whether any court will 
reach the merits of these claims. In cases filed to date, federal courts have 
been skeptical that private firms and the U.S. House of Representatives have 
suffered the sort of injury necessary to support Article III standing. Whether 
or not these challenges are ultimately deemed justiciable, the argument 
against the lawfulness of the employer mandate delay is, on the merits, quite 
strong. Regrettably, it is not an isolated example. 
III. TAILORING UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The effort to delay the enforcement of the employer mandate was not 
the only instance of the Obama Administration seeking to blunt the impact 
of federal law on private parties by altering the scope or effect of relevant 
legal obligations under the guise of executive discretion. The Administration 
also sought to relieve private firms of obligations to control greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) under the CAA,45 only to be rebuked by the Supreme Court. 
The CAA imposes a comprehensive regulatory regime on the emission 
of designated air pollutants. Greenhouse gases are covered by the CAA due 
to the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.46 In response 
to that decision, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
began to take steps to regulate such emissions, making a formal finding that 
greenhouse gases cause or contribute to air pollution that may be anticipated 
to endanger public health and the environment47 and adopting regulations 
governing such emissions from mobile sources.48 The EPA also concluded 
that the Court’s conclusion that GHGs are air pollutants under the Act 
required it to regulate emissions from stationary sources as well.49 But this 
44 Id. at 1968. 
45 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
46 549 U.S. 497 (2007). For a critique of the Massachusetts decision, see Jonathan H. Adler, 
Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 3 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61 (2007). 
47 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
48 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,323 (May 7, 2010). 
49 See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by 
Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010); see also Coalition for Resp. Reg., 
Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that under the EPA’s “longstanding interpretation 
of the CAA” regulation of mobile source GHG emissions “automatically triggered” regulation of 
stationary source emissions). This interpretation of the CAA was rejected by the Supreme Court in Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014). 
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created a problem, as it would have required the EPA to do too much. 
The relevant provisions of the CAA require the regulation of all 
facilities that emit more than set levels of covered pollutants, either 250 or 
100 tons per year.50 These thresholds make perfect sense for traditional air 
pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide. Applied to GHGs, however, these 
thresholds increase the universe of regulated facilities many times over—so 
much so that the resulting regulatory obligations would grind operations of 
the EPA and state permitting agencies to a halt.51 According to the EPA’s 
estimates, applying the statutory thresholds to greenhouse gases would have 
cost the government alone over $15 billion.52 Given the extreme 
impracticality of seeking to apply the CAA in this way, the EPA asserted the 
authority to narrow the scope of its authority.53 Specifically, it redefined the 
statutory thresholds for regulation under the relevant provisions of the Act, 
substituting 75,000 and 100,000 tons per year for 100 and 250 tons per year, 
and reserved the authority to redefine these thresholds further as 
circumstances allow.54 This rule—the so-called tailoring rule was challenged 
in court. 
The EPA’s view that focusing its regulatory efforts on the largest 
emitters of GHGs made policy sense was consistent with the agency’s 
resources and staffing levels, but it was not what the relevant provisions 
authorized. If, as the EPA claimed, it was required to treat GHGs as air 
pollutants under these provisions of the Act, it had to apply the thresholds 
Congress provided. 
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1990). 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) adopts the definition provided in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7602(j) defining a “major” source as “any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly 
emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant.” For regulation 
of hazardous air pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) incorporates the even more stringent definition contained 
in 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
51 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule; Proposed 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,294 (Oct. 27, 2009). As the EPA explained: 
If PSD and Title V requirements apply at the applicability levels provided under the CAA, many 
small sources would be burdened by the costs of individualized PSD control technology 
requirements and permit applications. In addition, State permitting authorities would be paralyzed 
by enormous numbers of these permit applications; the numbers are orders of magnitude greater than 
the current inventory of permits and would vastly exceed the current administrative resources of the 
permitting authorities. 
Id.
52 Id. at 55,302. Industry groups estimated that the costs of applying the relevant statutory 
thresholds would have been even greater than the EPA suggested. See, e.g., A Regulatory Burden: The 
Compliance Dimension of Regulating CO2 as a Pollutant, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Sept. 2008). 
53 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009). 
54 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule: Final 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). 
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Here again, claims about enforcement discretion did not help the 
Administration. This is because the Clean Air Act obligates regulated 
facilities to obtain permits in order to operate. If they do not have permits, 
they are violating the law. Enforcement discretion would authorize a decision 
by the EPA to go easy on smaller unpermitted facilities, and perhaps even to 
ignore them altogether given resource constraints, but that is not what the 
EPA sought to do. Rather, the agency sought to relieve facilities of any legal 
obligation whatsoever—to lift the obligation to obtain a permit and, it is 
important to note, the exposure to citizen suits lack of a permit can produce. 
Here again, the Administration claimed an authority to ease in burdens, 
and act transitionally, phasing in the regulatory requirements imposed by the 
statute. According to the EPA, it was acting in a step-by-step manner and 
hoped, eventually, to impose its regulations on all facilities within the 
statutory thresholds. Here again there was no delegation of authority to take 
such steps. 
The EPA’s actions survived review in the D.C. Circuit,55 but not in the 
Supreme Court.56 Writing for a five-justice majority, the late Justice Scalia 
explained why the EPA’s assertion of authority could not be justified as a 
traditional exercise of executive authority or enforcement discretion.57
First, Justice Scalia noted that when an agency asserts the authority to 
withhold the effect of a statute—to delay a requirement or narrow the range 
of a statutory provision’s application—the agency is engaged in aggrandizing 
its own power. Further, he noted, agency authority to interpret ambiguous 
statutory provisions does not include the power to rewrite such provisions. 
The court reaffirmed that an agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory 
text must still be reasonable and consonant with the statutory text. 
An agency has no power to “tailor” legislation to bureaucratic policy 
goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies exercise 
discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or 
ambiguity; they must always “give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.” . . . It is hard to imagine a statutory term 
less ambiguous than the precise numerical thresholds at which the Act 
requires PSD and Title V permitting. When EPA replaced those 
numbers with others of its own choosing, it went well beyond the 
“bounds of its statutory authority.”58
The Court also made clear that an agency’s enforcement discretion does 
not allow it to alter underlying legal obligations, and that not even the 
55 See Coalition for Resp. Reg., Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
56 See Utility Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2445 (citations and quotations omitted). 
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Solicitor General was willing to try and argue otherwise: 
The Solicitor General does not, and cannot, defend the Tailoring Rule 
as an exercise of EPA’s enforcement discretion. The Tailoring Rule is 
not just an announcement of EPA’s refusal to enforce the statutory 
permitting requirements; it purports to alter those requirements and to 
establish with the force of law that otherwise-prohibited conduct will 
not violate the Act.59
This ruling is important not only because it constrained the EPA’s 
attempt at self-aggrandizement, but because it reaffirms the limits of 
executive authority, and reaffirms that good policy reasons for seeking to 
limit the scope or cost of a statute are insufficient to justify administrative 
efforts to rewrite a statute. 
CONCLUSION
To conclude, let us return to where we started, with basic principles 
about the nature of executive power. The Executive Branch has broad 
enforcement discretion, but this is discretion about how to enforce the law; it 
is not authority to rewrite the law or alter the way in which the law itself 
applies to private parties. Administrative agencies often have the authority to 
alter the benefits and burdens created by a given statutory scheme. Yet 
because agencies only have that authority which has been delegated to them 
by Congress, they only have the power to make such alterations insofar as 
such authority has been granted by Congress. What this means is that where 
a law imposes significant burdens, and policymakers conclude that such 
burdens are excessive (or politically inconvenient), our constitutional 
structure leaves responsibility for enacting a fix to Congress in the first 
instance.
To say that the Administration lacked the authority to delay the 
employer mandate or tailor the regulatory thresholds for greenhouse gases is 
not to say that either step would have represented unsound policy. Insofar as 
the ACA’s employer mandate is problematic, or the precise numerical 
thresholds embodied in the CAA are impractical when applied to greenhouse 
gases, it is up to the legislature to enact or authorize a fix. Unilateral efforts 
to rewrite or alter the application of properly enacted laws aggrandize 
executive power. They also facilitate the evasion of responsibility by the 
legislature.
The effort to assert unilateral executive authority in these cases has 
broader implications than these immediate controversies. The assertion of 
unilateral authority to delay the employer mandate, for instance, could set a 
59 Id. (emphasis in original).
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dangerous precedent for agency action in the future.60 If so, it would mark a 
dramatic shift in the separation of powers. As Bagley explains: 
[T]he Obama Administration’s claim of enforcement discretion, if 
accepted, would limit Congress’s ability to specify when and under what 
circumstances its laws should take effect. That circumscription of 
legislative authority would mark a major shift of constitutional power 
away from Congress, which makes the laws, and toward the President, 
who is supposed to enforce them.61
In this regard, far more is at stake in the confusion over the nature of 
enforcement discretion than the Obama Administration’s ability to 
implement high profile administration initiatives. Should this confusion not 
be corrected, it could facilitate a dramatic expansion of executive power, and 
any such expansion could have significant implications for years to come. 
60 See Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1144–45 
(2015).
61 Bagley, supra note 43, at 1969. 
